Peterson v. Borst (Ind.S.Ct. 3/19/03) [Access Appendices here]
Per curiam
This opinion begins:
At issue in this appeal is the validity of the redistricting plan for the City-County Council of the City of Indianapolis and of Marion County, Indiana (“Council”), which was adopted in the final judgment of the Marion Superior Court, sitting en banc. We reverse because we conclude that the Superior Court’s adoption of a plan that has been uniformly supported by one major political party and uniformly opposed by the other is incompatible with applicable principles of both the appearance and fact of judicial independence and neutrality. Because of the emergency nature of this appeal, we adopt a plan that we have drawn with the consideration of only factors required by applicable federal and State law, and without consideration of party affiliation or incumbency. This plan will be in effect for the May 6, 2003, primary election unless a different plan is adopted by ordinance prior to March 26, 2003.
This opinion concludes:
It is with great reluctance that we embark on resolving this politically-charged redistricting issue. We conclude, however, that when the Council and the mayor are unable to reach a suitable political solution, the Redistricting Statute calls on the judiciary to resolve the deadlock through a judicial decision, marked by the principles of independence and neutrality. The decision by the Marion Superior Court to adopt, by a close, party-line vote, a plan that has been uniformly supported by one major political party and uniformly opposed by the other, cannot be reconciled with both the appearance and fact of scrupulous judicial neutrality. Rather, a judicial decision calls for the adoption of a plan that considers only politically neutral factors required by federal and State constitutions and statutes.In-between is an important discussion of the judiciary's role in redistricting disputes. The 1969 Univgov Act, which reorganized the governance of Indianapolis/Marion County, contains a "Redistricting Statute" that provides that the city-county legislative body shall, by ordinance, divide the whole county into 25 districts meeting specified criteria. IC 36-3-4-3. Subsection (d) provides for court review. In this regard, the Court writes:
If we remanded this case, we have no reason to doubt the Superior Court’s ability and willingness to follow our guidance on this issue of first impression in this State. However, due to severe time constraints involved, we have chosen instead to adopt a plan consistent with the principles we have set forth, subject to redrawing through an appropriate legislative process.
The Court’s plan was drawn with strict neutrality, without consideration of party affiliation or incumbency. The Court imposed neither the Borst Plan proposed by the Republican majority of the Council ... nor the Boyd Plan proposed by the Democratic minority....
For the reasons above, the judgment of the Marion Superior Court is reversed. The redistricting plan attached to and incorporated by reference into this opinion will govern the district boundaries of the Council unless and until a different plan is enacted. ...
This is the first time that the Redistricting Statute has ever been invoked, and none of the parties have called to our attention, and we are not aware of, any Indiana state court decisions resolving partisan redistricting disputes. Thus, we write on a clean slate as to the duties and obligations of the Indiana judiciary in such circumstances.The Indianapolis Star had a number of stories on the Court's decision, including those on 3/20/03 "Supreme Court redraws districts: Move creates 11 open seats on council and pits incumbents against each other," and 3/25/03 "Council map agreement is hopeless: Leaders call off meeting to craft deal; both sides seek new high court rulings," and an editorial on 3/22/03 "New council map is best for voters."
* * * * * Based on the unchallenged principle of judicial independence and neutrality, we hold that in resolving partisan redistricting disputes, Indiana judges must consider only the factors required by applicable federal and State law. We conclude that this was the intent of the legislature in providing both the criteria for district boundaries and the dispute resolution mechanism that it did. Whatever role politics may legitimately play in the decisions and maneuverings of the legislative and executive branches, if those branches cannot reach a political resolution and the dispute spills over into an Indiana court, the resolution must be judicial, not political. Thus, Indiana judges may not consider the partisan political consequences of redistricting plans because this is not among the constitutional and statutory factors that inform a judicial decision.
* * * * * A court called upon to draw a map on a clean slate should do so with both the appearance and fact of scrupulous neutrality.
* * * * * [W]hen faced with a politically polarized redistricting dispute like the one in this case, a court’s adoption of a plan that represents one political party's idea of how district boundaries should be drawn does not conform to the principle of judicial independence and neutrality.
* * * * * Having concluded that the Superior Court’s adoption of the Borst Plan cannot stand, we turn to the question of what to do next. If time were not of the essence and the administrative complexities of a 32-member court reaching a decision not so daunting, we would remand this matter to the Superior Court with instructions to redraw the district boundaries, with the aid of a master if the court found it necessary, considering only the factors required by applicable federal and State law. But time is of the essence. ... Given these time pressures, we find it appropriate and necessary to draw the district boundaries ourselves.
* * * * * In redrawing the district lines, we gave primary consideration to the following factors mandated by the Redistricting Statute: equality of population, compactness, and the prohibition against crossing precinct boundary lines. We also considered township lines, major rivers and thoroughfares, and school districts. These criteria were used as parameters for a leading computer program designed for redistricting. This program, in fact, was the same one used by both parties in this appeal. The program was used to draw a plan based solely on the identified criteria without consideration of party affiliation or incumbency. In fact, this Court had no data available on these political factors. A description by precinct of that plan is attached as Appendix A. A map reflecting the district boundaries is attached as Appendix B. Appendices A and B are hereby incorporated into this opinion by reference. In addition, maps of the Borst Plan and the Boyd Plan are attached as Appendices C and D, respectively.
The ideal population of each Council district is 34,418. The deviation from this ideal for most of the districts in the plan adopted by this Court is less than one percent, and none deviates by more than 1.8 percent. The attached Appendix E provides further statistical information about this plan. The districts are as compact as possible, given the goal of maximizing population equality and the mandate to respect precinct lines. In many instances, straight lines between districts were rendered impossible by the irregular and widely varied shapes and sizes of precincts. Nearly all of the irregular protrusions from one district into another resulted from irregularly shaped precincts. Just a very few irregularities were needed to maintain population balance. ... As a practical matter, rivers, thoroughfares, and school districts ended up playing a fairly minor role in the process because of the statutory requirement that precincts be used as the basic building blocks of districts and because we gave a higher priority to population equality and compactness.
Nothing in this opinion prevents the Council, subject to veto by Mayor Peterson, from redrawing these boundaries at any time under I.C. § 36-3-4-3(a). ...
Subsequent action. A copy of the Supreme Court's 3/27/03 order denying a peitition for rehearing and its orders denying a motion to modify deadlines and a motion to modify residency requirements may be accessed here.
Posted by Marcia Oddi at March 28, 2003 02:17 PM